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Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of what we know about organized forms of
cybercrime executed with a financial goal. First, criminal cooperation is covered.
We discuss recent insights into the structure, composition, and mechanisms of
origin and growth. Second, bottlenecks in the criminal business process and
criminal money flows are described. Every criminal business process entails
logistical bottlenecks: logistical problems that must be resolved to ensure the
successful execution of criminal activities. One major bottleneck is safely spend-
ing illegally obtained money without drawing the attention of the authorities.
After all, when it comes to financial cybercrime, the goal of criminals is gaining
financial benefits. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, several overarching
conclusions about organized forms of cybercrime are presented.
Keywords
Cybercriminal network · Criminal network · Organized crime · Cybercrime ·
Dark web
Introduction
This chapter examines the collaborations between cybercriminals. A well-known
fact in the criminological literature is that most criminals cooperate quite intensively
with other criminals (e.g., Shaw and McKay 1931; Sutherland 1937; Reiss 1988;
Reiss and Farrington 1991; Andresen and Felson 2010). For the successful com-
mission of crimes, various people with specific human and social capital – knowl-
edge, expertise, and contacts – are often required. The same applies to
cybercriminals. Although there are hackers who can hack into systems on their
own, studies show that when it comes to financially motivated cybercrimes, various
individuals with diverse knowledge and skills are required to commit crimes,
including phishing, banking malware, and ransomware (Grabosky 2007; Broadhurst
et al. 2014; Hutchings 2014; Leukfeldt 2014, 2016; Leukfeldt et al. 2017a, b, c, d,
e, f; Kruisbergen et al. 2018).
Despite the fact that cooperation and social capital still seem to be important for
cybercriminal networks, digitization also provides new opportunities for criminal
collaboration and changes the ways criminals meet, interact, and execute their
crimes. Online meeting places on the clear web and dark web, for example, enable
individuals to get in touch with others from all over the world and enter into new
criminal collaborations. Knowledge and expertise can be purchased relatively easily
on online markets where all sorts of criminal tools and services are offered, including
review and rating systems distinguishing reliable from unreliable sellers.
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This chapter provides an overview of what we know about organized forms of
cybercrime executed with a financial goal. We, therefore, exclude networks having,
for example, a solely political or ideological goal. First, criminal cooperation is
covered. We discuss recent insights into the structure, composition, and mechanisms
of origin and growth. Second, bottlenecks in the criminal business process and
criminal money flows are described. Every criminal business process entails logis-
tical bottlenecks: logistical problems that must be resolved to ensure the successful
execution of criminal activities. One major bottleneck is safely spending illegally
obtained money without drawing the attention of the authorities. After all, when it
comes to financial cybercrime, the goal of criminals is gaining financial benefits.
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, several overarching conclusions about
organized forms of cybercrime are presented.
Criminal Cooperation and the Use of IT
What do we know about the origin of cybercriminal networks? What are the
opportunities and limitations for the growth of these criminal networks? In this
section, we focus on criminal cooperation and the use of IT by discussing recent
insights into the structure, composition, origin, and growth of cybercriminal
networks.
Structure and Composition
In theory, the Internet offers a viable opportunity structure for decentralized, flexible
networks of criminals who are loosely organized and divide their activities based on
knowledge and skills. Various studies show that cybercriminals use online meeting
places to meet suitable co-offenders or to buy criminal tools from enables (e.g.,
Peretti 2008; Lu et al. 2010; Holt and Lampke 2010; Yip et al. 2012; Soudijn and
Monsma 2012; Holt 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Decary-Hétu and Dupont 2012;
Decary-Hétu et al. 2012; Motoyama et al. 2013; Lusthaus 2012; Dupont et al. 2016).
However, this does not mean that all cybercriminal networks are using these online
meeting places, and the structure of cybercriminal networks, therefore, is always
decentralized and flexible. In practice, this picture seems to be more complex. There
are networks that fully use the opportunities of the Internet. For example, members
of certain networks can quickly gain an international position through the use of
online criminal meeting places (Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, d) or enter into a chain-like
collaboration with other criminals who each carry out a specific criminal activity
(Bulanova-Hristova et al. 2016; Odinot et al. 2017). The members of these networks
only know each other by their online nicknames and recruit specialists on encrypted
chat channels and markets on the open and dark web. However, there are also
networks at the other end of the spectrum, with a fixed group of core members
who have known each other for a long time from the offline world and only use
criminal facilitators that can be recruited from their own offline social network.
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Empirical research into organized cybercrime in the Netherlands, Germany,
England, Sweden, and the United States shows that the structure of a number of
cybercriminal networks is similar to that of traditional networks (Bulanova-Hristova
et al. 2016; Werner and Korsell 2016; Leukfeldt et al. 2017b, c, d; Odinot et al. 2017;
Kruisbergen et al. 2018; Leukfeldt et al. 2019). For example, most of the cyber-
criminal networks studied by these authors consisted of a more or less stable group
of core members who committed offenses together for a prolonged period of time.
The core members of these networks often knew each other from the physical world.
Only a limited number of specialists were recruited through online meeting places.
In addition, only a few networks turned out to be ad hoc collaborations in which
alliances were forged at an online meeting place, leading up to attacks being carried
out together.
Furthermore, several studies on cybercriminal networks illustrate, similar to
traditional networks, the importance of actors functioning as brokers (Soudijn and
Monsma 2012; Lu et al. 2010; Yip et al. 2012; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Décary-
Hétu and Dupont 2012; Décary-Hétu et al. 2012; Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, e, 2019).
Traditionally, so-called brokers were needed to overcome the limitations of offline
social networks. In the pre-digital era, only real-world social contacts could be used
to get into touch with other criminals and to expand criminal networks (see, e.g.,
Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972; Kleemans and De Poot 2008; Edwards and Levi 2008;
Bouchard and Morselli 2014). However, social clusters are always limited, for
example, to a region or country. In order to expand the criminal network and the
criminal capabilities of the network, contacts have to be forged outside the initial
social cluster. Offender convergence settings and brokers can be used to do just that
(for more information about offender convergence settings, see the subsection
“Forums as Online Meeting Places”). Due to his unique position, the broker is an
important node in the criminal network. Even though cybercriminals now are able to
use online meeting places to get into touch with other suitable criminals, the overall
conclusion from both qualitative analysis of police files and quantitative social
network analysis of forum data is that, overall, although in some cases the role of
brokers seems to diminish, networks still include members that are more important
for the functioning of the network than others (Soudijn and Monsma 2012; Lu et al.
2010; Yip et al. 2012; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012;
Décary-Hétu et al. 2012; Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, e).
Finally, there is evidence that cybercriminal networks have a certain degree of
hierarchy. Despite the absence of Mafia-like pyramidal organizational structures, all
analyzed networks by Leukfeldt et al. (2017a, b, c) have several different and
discernible layers of members. Core members are at the top of the network. They
work together for a long time, engage in planning criminal activities, and find other
suitable co-offenders. Below the core members, there are facilitators providing
specific criminal services to improve the criminal activities of the core members of
the criminal network. A distinction can be made between professional and recruited
facilitators: the former offer their services to all kinds of networks, whereas the latter
are recruited by core members to provide specific services for the criminal network.
The bottom layer of the network is formed by so-called money mules. This is a group
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of criminals who are deployed either by the core members or by facilitators, to shield
the criminal activities of the network from law enforcement authorities. For example,
the accounts of money mules are used to withdraw the cash of victims of phishing.
In conclusion, there are networks showing many similarities with traditional
criminal networks – long-term cooperation between the core members and depen-
dency relationships – and there are networks in which the specialized individual
members are engaged in more short-term collaborations. These differences in struc-
ture are related to the origin and growth processes of these networks (Bulanova-
Hristova et al. 2016; Leukfeldt et al. 2017b, c, d). Traditional criminal networks that
also start engaging in cybercrimes retain their original structure. Networks that only
commit cybercrimes but are the results of offline social contacts also have a similar
structure to that of traditional criminal networks. Networks that only commit cyber-
crimes and where the core members met each other online sometimes have a
traditional structure (contacts on online meeting places can also be long-term; see,
e.g., Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, d), but this type of network also sometimes demonstrates
short-term (chain-like) cooperation.
Facilitators
Similar to traditional networks, facilitators also play an important role in cyber-
criminal networks. A few networks manage to commit crimes without the services of
others, but the majority of the networks make (extensive) use of facilitators (Odinot
et al. 2017; Bulanova-Hristova et al. 2016; Leukfeldt et al. 2017a, b, c, d, e;
Kruisbergen et al. 2018; Leukfeldt et al. 2019). Indeed, that is exactly why there is
so much activity on online meeting places such as cryptomarkets (e.g., Peretti 2008,
Holt and Lampke 2010; Chu et al. 2010; Soudijn and Monsma 2012; Lu et al. 2010;
Yip et al. 2013; Holt 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014). We can distinguish between
professional criminal facilitators who offer their services themselves and work for all
sorts of criminal networks and recruited criminal facilitators deployed by a specific
network. Examples of professional criminal facilitators are malware writers supply-
ing malware that can be used to take over computers, hackers offering their services
to break into databases, or people having access to networks of money mules in all
sorts of countries that can be used to launder money. These professional criminal
facilitators often offer their services on forums, but contacts between core members
and facilitators can also be established within offline social networks or offline
criminal meeting places. Examples of recruited criminal facilitators are bank
employees who provide data of “interesting” bank accounts or who can increase
withdrawal and credit limits, which means fewer accounts of money mules are
required when “cashing” money originating from phishing attacks. Usually, these
facilitators are recruited through offline or online social contacts (see, e.g., Leukfeldt
et al. 2017a, b, c, d, e, f).
Little is known about the role that facilitators play in bridging the gap between the
“underworld” and “upperworld” for cybercriminal networks. For example, the study
of Leukfeldt et al. (2017a) shows that even though respondents indicate that in some
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cases there has to be involvement of corrupt Eastern European or Russian govern-
ment employees, no such evidence was found in the analyzed criminal investiga-
tions. It is clear, however, that employees of legitimate companies are sometimes
recruited by members of cybercriminal groups to cooperate during criminal activi-
ties. This is exemplified by the earlier mentioned bank employees who have insight
into the accounts of potential victims or who can increase withdrawal of credit limits
of the accounts of money mules (Leukfeldt 2014). Legitimate infrastructures are also
abused by criminals to commit their offenses (Odinot et al. 2017; Bijlenga and
Kleemans 2018). Hosting providers offering legal services, such as renting out
server space, or shady or illegal services, such as bulletproof web hosting, make it
very difficult for law enforcement agencies to intervene. Another example consists
of online advertising companies showing advertisements on a large number of
websites and, specifically, reported cases where advertisements spread malware.
Furthermore, legitimate companies such as web shops where items are bought
with criminally earned money or parcel deliverers who intercept goods purchased
with fraudulent transfers are examples of these intertwining legal and illegal inter-
faces. Finally, this also relates to financial infrastructures that can be abused, for
example, for making mutual payments using e-currencies, such as bitcoins, or the
use of exchangers converting e-currencies into euros or US dollars (Odinot et al.
2017; Leukfeldt et al. 2017b, c, d, e).
Finally, there is also the fact that IT is, to a certain extent, neutral and that it is
often only when it is actually implemented that it leads to illegal activities. This
offers many more opportunities for offenders to cooperate with the legal world,
particularly in the “gray zone” between legal and illegal applications of IT. Research
by Bijlenga and Kleemans (2018) illustrates that criminals sometimes easily find IT
expertise in this “gray zone,” because certain tools are sometimes offered entirely
legally, via the Internet or via Spyshops (in addition to which extra services are
provided to criminal customers). Also when tools are modified (for criminal pur-
poses), experts do not need to know beforehand what the tools will eventually be
used for. As a result, business cooperation can easily be established (based on supply
and demand) via working relationships or via online or offline meeting places.
Criminals can also get straight to the point fairly quickly because at the start of the
collaboration, the criminal character does not have to be clearly visible to the person
concerned or it can be denied afterward (Bijlenga and Kleemans 2018). In that
respect, the neutrality of IT facilitates cooperation.
Forums as Online Meeting Places
Due to the large number of criminal service providers on forums, finding suitable
criminal facilitators for cybercriminal networks may be less difficult than for tradi-
tional networks (Lusthaus 2012; Yip et al. 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Holt et al.
2015; Dupont et al. 2016; Holt and Lampke 2010, Soudijn and Zegers 2012;
Leukfeldt 2014; Franklin et al. 2007; Wehinger 2011). In theory, this makes criminal
facilitators easier to replace. Nevertheless, the analyses of Bulanova-Hristova et al.
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(2016) and Leukfeldt et al. (2017b, c, d) show that cybercriminal groups sometimes
cooperate with the same facilitator for a sustained period of time. On the one hand,
forums with their rating and review systems have become quite useful at finding
reliable facilitators, but on the other hand, we also know that only a very small
proportion of the forums have a very high degree of technical expertise (Holt 2007;
Holt et al. 2015) and that review systems do not always work well (Holt et al. 2015;
Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2013; Dupont et al. 2016). Therefore, the question remains
how easily replaceable these facilitators with a very high degree of technical
expertise actually are.
Regarding trust and online meeting places, we know that closed forums require a
good reputation for entry. To access the forum, potential members are screened by
administrators (or members appointed by the administrator), and new members must
provide evidence that they are active in cybercrime (e.g., by providing stolen credit
card data or a tutorial) (Soudijn and Zegers 2012; Yip et al. 2013; Lusthaus 2012;
Ablon et al. 2014; Holt et al. 2015). Lusthaus (2012) also emphasizes the social
mechanisms on a forum. In addition, the reputation of a member can be inferred from
a specific status, such as “new member,” “seller,” or “verified seller.” Finally, many
forums have a review system; members who have purchased data, tools, or services
assess the vendor by means of a written review or a score on a rating scale (Soudijn
and Zegers 2012; Herley and Florencio 2009; Wehinger 2011; Yip et al. 2013;
Lusthaus 2012; Dupont et al. 2016; Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012, 2013; Holt
2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Holt et al. 2015; Chu et al. 2010; Ablon et al. 2014).
Some forums try to make access (or access to certain parts of the forum) selective,
through requirements regarding the status of “applicants,” relations they have with
existing members, or technical skills (has the applicant additional value for existing
members?). An analysis by Dupont et al. (2017) of an exclusive forum shows,
however, that eventually, many applicants get access to this “exclusive” forum
without having the necessary technical added value. It might very well be the case
that the commercial pressure to provide access to as many members as possible
(which means: potential clients and co-offenders) is stronger than the wish to
remain “exclusive” and “safe.” This problem is even stronger regarding the selling
of stolen data, credit card credentials, and malware, as these goods and services can
be easily resold or even “leaked,” which means they may immediately lose their
commercial value.
To what extent the trust problem is really solved is an important question that still
remains to be answered. How do you know a site can be trusted and is not
administered by the police (such as Hansa market, taken over by the Dutch police
in 2017) or taken down by the administrators (including taking away all the money
and data)? How can buyers and sellers trust each other? And how are goods and
services delivered and paid? New technical possibilities provide solutions for certain
problems, but some problems may still exist or only take a different shape.
Facilitators active on forums offer their services to multiple individuals and
networks (e.g., Peretti 2008; Holt and Lampke 2010; Chu et al. 2010; Soudijn and
Monsma 2012; Lu et al. 2010; Yip et al. 2013; Holt 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014).
Potential buyers can contact the seller through various channels, for example, via
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private message on the forum or chat channels outside of the forum. Payments can be
made with currently used virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, e-Gold, Liberty
Reserve, WebMoney, Yandex, and Western Union (Franklin et al. 2007; Holt and
Lampke 2010; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Holt et al. 2015).
Various types of goods are offered through such online forums, such as stolen
data, cybercriminal tools and services, as well as more traditional items, such as
drugs, medicines, and weapons. Stolen data includes data from credit cards, bank
accounts and PayPal accounts, and identity documents (Franklin et al. 2007; Holt
and Lampke 2010; Peretti 2008; Holt et al. 2015; Chu et al. 2010; Holt and Smirnova
2014; Wehinger 2011; Soudijn and Zegers 2012; Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, d, e, f).
Examples of criminal tools are phishing kits and malware (Holt and Lampke 2010;
Herley and Florencio 2009; Soudijn and Zegers 2012; Leukfeldt 2014; Leukfeldt et
al. 2017c, d; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Chu et al. 2010) or botnets and DDoS attacks
(Franklin et al. 2007; Chu et al. 2010; Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012). Services that
are offered include, for example, “escrow services” through which third parties can
safely pay (Lusthaus 2012; Yip et al. 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Holt et al.
2015; Dupont et al. 2016), “exchangers” converting virtual money into real money
(Holt and Lampke 2010), “money mules” to “cash” criminal earnings (Soudijn and
Zegers 2012; Leukfeldt 2014), other “cash-out services” such as buying goods with
stolen credit cards (Franklin et al. 2007; Wehinger 2011), and “bulletproof
webhosting” (Franklin et al. 2007).
Leukfeldt (2017) also discusses the functions of these online “offender conver-
gence settings”: the market function, the social function, and the learning function.
According to these authors, the learning function of online forums turns out to be
very important and easily accessible for many users. In contrast to normal conver-
gence settings, the constraints of space and time are absent. Bilateral relationships
and conversations can be started immediately; even acquaintances can meet here
anonymously (without bystanders noticing this). These convergence settings, there-
fore, can be primarily characterized as a “free market,” but anonymity makes
building up trust with strangers more difficult. This might be no problem for small
business transactions, such as smaller quantities of drugs, particularly when use can
be made of “escrow services,”which means that the administrators of the website (or
a cooperating third party) function as a go-between for payments and deliveries: the
seller receives the payment of the buyer only when the buyer receives the ordered
goods. This way, an important logistical problem of buyer and seller is solved: buyer
and seller do not have to meet each other in person to hand over drugs and money at
the same spot and at the same time (with all the accompanied risks of discovery as
well as opportunistic behavior, cheating, violence, and conflicts).
Origin and Growth Mechanisms
Within traditional offline criminal networks, social ties play an important role within
the processes of origin and growth (e.g., Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972; Kleemans and
De Poot 2008; Edwards and Levi 2008; Bouchard and Morselli 2014). Offline social
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networks are crucial for the success of criminal networks. The right social capital
(knowledge, expertise, contacts) is needed to successfully set up criminal collabo-
rations. However, social contacts also have restrictions because they are limited, for
example, to a specific region. Contrary to the offline world, no geographical dis-
tances have to be bridged in order to come into contact with other perpetrators
online. Therefore, distance, location, and time are in principle no longer limiting
factors for criminal cooperation.
Several studies show that digitization, and particularly online criminal meeting
places, can influence the origin and growth processes of criminal networks. Soudijn
and Zegers (2012) and Yip et al. (2012) show that newcomers on virtual meeting
places instantly get in touch with existing forum members and take a more central
position relatively quickly. The important role that central actors normally play
within networks, therefore, seems to decrease in an online environment.
However, the studies by Leukfeldt (2014), Leukfeldt et al. (2017a, c, d, 2019),
Bulanova-Hristova et al. (2016), and Odinot et al. (2017) show that cybercriminal
networks use both offline social contacts and virtual meeting places. In networks
where offline social contacts form the basis for origin and growth, it can be noticed
that family, friends, and acquaintances work together and introduce each other to
other people just as within traditional criminal networks. Moreover, it turns out that
only one single network completely relies on offline social relationships. Online
forums are used by these types of networks to acquire specialist knowledge and
skills that are lacking in offline social relations, for example, the purchase of
advanced malware that can be used to commit fraud with Internet banking. In
networks where online contacts form the basis for the origin and growth of the
network, a dichotomy can also be observed. On the one hand, members of these
networks got to know each other online, for example, via chat channels, or on
forums. On the other hand, a minority of the networks seem to be able to carry out
criminal activities with only their online contacts. Within these networks, not only
the core members got to know each other online, but all facilitators were also
recruited online. In other networks the core members met each other online; they
recruited online facilitators but also used offline contacts, for example, to set up a
network of money mules.
Online meeting places ensure that the traditional limitations of social networks
are lifted. In fact, there is no substantial difference with traditional offline criminal
meeting places: once you are inside, you can make contact, and you can meet people
who can, for example, provide new markets (see Felson 2003, 2006). Therefore,
online meeting places are essentially not new. However, it seems that online meeting
places are more accessible than offline criminal meeting places (Leukfeldt et al.
2017c, d). For the curious loner, it is easier to hang around and ask questions on
public forums than in a bar full of criminals. Moreover, it is important to note that
there is a subculture on these forums in which sharing of information about criminal
endeavors is fairly normal (Chu et al. 2010; Holt and Kilger 2008; Holt et al. 2012;
Hutchings and Holt 2015; Hutchings 2014; Leukfeldt et al. 2017c, e; Soudijn and
Zegers 2012). Therefore, someone who wants to learn can go to a forum. Informa-
tion is available through the online discussions, and there are also possibilities to pay
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people to teach you a specific skill (Hutchings and Holt 2015; Chu et al. 2010;
Holt and Lampke 2010). Reliable co-offenders can be found thanks to the rating and
review systems on forums (Soudijn and Zegers 2012; Herley and Florencio 2009;
Wehinger 2011; Yip et al. 2013; Lusthaus 2012; Dupont et al. 2016; Décary-Hétu
and Dupont 2012, 2013; Holt 2013; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Holt et al. 2015; Chu
et al. 2010; Ablon et al. 2014).
Local Embeddedness
Little research has been carried out into the local embeddedness of cybercrime (see,
among others, Leukfeldt et al. 2017f, 2019; Lusthaus and Varese 2017). Leukfeldt et
al. (2017c, d, e) show that phishing and malware attacks on payment transactions are
locally embedded. This can be noticed in both Dutch networks and networks
operating, for example, from Eastern European countries. Crucial to this type of
attack are money mules having accounts to which money can be transferred from
victim accounts, before the money is cashed and laundered. When money is trans-
ferred to money mules in countries other than that of the victim, this will be noted by
the banks using customer payment profiles who monitor and stop unusual trans-
actions. In the next section, criminal money flows will be discussed in greater detail.
Bottlenecks and Criminal Money Flows
The ultimate goal of offenders of financial cybercrime is to make money. However,
generating criminal earnings also poses problems for offenders. How can one enjoy
ones money without drawing unwanted attention from law enforcement authorities?
In other words, managing criminal money flows constitutes a bottleneck in criminal
business processes. The following section outlines the earnings, spending, and
hiding and laundering of criminal proceeds.
Criminal Earnings
Various estimates of cybercrime markets and the damage caused by cybercrime
circulate (e.g., Aldridge and Decary-Hetu (2014; see also EMCDDA 2016), Christin
(2012), Holt et al. (2016), Kruithof et al. (2016) (see EMCDDA and Europol 2017),
Anderson et al. (2012)). Attempts have also been made to estimate the size of
specific online cybercrime markets (e.g., Dhanjani and Rios 2008; Holz et al.
2009), but this seems to be a difficult if not impossible task due to the variety of
the offered goods, the lack of clarity about the differences between the asking price
and the selling price (the deal being closed outside the forum), and the lack of
adequate data or instruments (Holt and Smirnova 2014; Herley and Florencio 2009).
Money flows in traditional organized crime often seem to remain invisible to
criminal investigators (Kruisbergen et al. 2016). The same seems to be true for
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cybercrime, as research in Sweden and the Netherlands shows (Werner and Korsell
2016; Odinot et al. 2017; Kruisbergen et al. 2018). Nevertheless, several studies do
generate important insights into money flows in cybercrime cases. The (presumed)
earnings in the 11 Dutch cases Odinot et al. (2017, p. 80) studied ranged from more
than 1 million euros to zero or unknown (because no information on earnings was
available). Investigation into German cases showed that the “damage” in 18 cases
would total 115 million euros (Bulanova-Hristova et al. 2016, p. 207).
Spending Criminal Earnings
When it comes to spending criminal earnings, in terms of both consumption and
investments (assets discovered), analyses show neither major differences compared
to previous research nor major differences between traditional crime and cybercrime
(Kruisbergen et al. 2018). Similar to cases of offline organized crime that have been
studied for previous reports of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor (Kruisbergen
et al. 2012, 2015, 2018), for example, some cybercrime cases include offenders who
have a lot of money to spend on an expensive lifestyle (Kruisbergen et al. 2018;
Odinot et al. 2017, p. 64; Leukfeldt 2014; Leukfeldt et al. 2017c). Earlier research
into offline cases of organized crime showed that offenders predominantly invest in
their country of origin or in their country of residence, which investments consist of
tangible, familiar assets, such as residences, other real estate, and mostly small
companies in well-known sectors. In many cases, the available information indicated
that the companies in which offenders invest were used for criminal activities, such
as transport or money laundering (Kruisbergen et al. 2015). Analyses of the 30 cases
in the most recent, fifth data sweep of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor produce
similar results. The 30 cases Kruisbergen and others studied cover traditional types
of organized crime as well as cybercrime. Their analyses show no major differences
between traditional crime and cybercrime (Kruisbergen et al. 2018).
Hiding and Laundering Criminal Earnings
When it comes to concealing criminal earnings, we do see important differences
between traditional organized crime on the one hand and cybercrime on the other
(Kruisbergen et al. 2018). Offenders who operate online, similar to their offline
counterparts, have to hide their income if they want to prevent detection (and their
money seized) by law enforcement. However, in various forms of cybercrime or
Internet-facilitated crime, unlike many forms of traditional organized crime, the
proceeds are often digital in nature.
This applies, for example, to phishing attacks, banking malware, and ransomware
but also to online drug trafficking. Oerlemans et al. (2016) investigated the cash
flows associated with banking malware and ransomware. Regarding banking
malware, where the damage has been greatly reduced in recent years, use is often
made of money mules, people who make their bank account available to criminals
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for a fee. Through banking malware, money is initially transferred from the victim’s
account to an account of a money mule who then withdraws the amount as quickly as
possible from an ATM. After cashing (or the cash-out), the money can be transferred
to foreign countries, for example, through money transfer offices, after which it is
withdrawn again by a (different) money mule abroad. (In addition to money mules,
identity fraud can also be used. This means that a payment service is taken via the
personal information of a third party. This payment service is then used, for example,
to further funnel the received money from the victim.) Another approach is that the
money generated through banking malware is used to purchase goods or services
directly, such as (luxury) goods at physical or web stores, or bitcoins (Oerlemans et
al. 2016). Regarding ransomware, revenues – the ransom – often consist of bitcoins
or credits from online vouchers. When bitcoins have been received, the offenders,
whether or not they have used a “mixing service,” can, for instance, spend or
exchange these bitcoins for a cash amount of euros at a physical bitcoin trader or a
bitcoin exchange (online exchange service). If the proceeds have been obtained from
vouchers purchased by the victim, the value of the vouchers is credited to an online
account of an e-wallet service. (An e-wallet is an online payment service (such as
PayPal) where money can be put in a personal account, after which payments can be
made at web shops (Oerlemans et al. 2016, pp. 107–108).) After which other
methods to shield the earning can be applied (Oerlemans et al. 2016).
We will now consider bitcoins, vouchers, and a few other new developments in
greater detail. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, a decentralized electronic currency. As
opposed to regular currencies such as euro or dollar, it is not distributed or controlled
by a central bank or any other (centralized) organization. There is, therefore, no
formal regulation or supervision governing the use of bitcoin. (This might change as
in some countries, such as Japan, where bitcoin is officially regarded as a payment
method.) Besides bitcoin there are several other cryptocurrencies, such as Ethereum,
Litecoin, and Dogecoin. In terms of market cap, bitcoin has been (and still is) the
most important cryptocurrency for quite some time, although the coin’s market cap
has decreased (EMCDDA 2016) (https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/).
Bitcoins are generated (mined) by a decentralized process, through a network of
users’ computers. The creation of a bitcoin is the result of an algorithm, a mathe-
matical formula. This process requires an enormous computer processing power and
consumes a high amount of energy. A person, however, might also simply buy
bitcoins using regular currencies, through an online bitcoin exchange service.
Bitcoins are stored in a wallet, a file that is saved on the user’s own computer, in
the cloud, on a smartphone, or on a USB device (among other things).
Not every type of virtual money or new payment method is operated by
decentralized, peer-to-peer technology such as bitcoin. WebMoney, for example, is
an online payment system which is centrally controlled. It is used for storage and
exchange of units of accounts. An account, or purse, can be held in several
currencies, such as euro, dollar, rubles, and bitcoin. Webmoney is accepted by
some webshops (Oerlemans et al. 2016, p. 54) (www.wmtransfer.com).
For people with criminal intentions, bitcoin potentially offers important advan-
tages. As mentioned earlier, bitcoin is not governed by supervision or regulations
governing the conventional financial sector, such as the obligation to report a
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suspicious transaction. This allows an individual to transfer bitcoins to anyone,
anywhere in the world, without having to leave the desk and without having to use
a supervised institution. A related advantage concerns the fact that bitcoin trans-
actions offer a certain degree of anonymity (Oerlemans et al. 2016; Kruisbergen and
Soudijn 2015).
The unregulated nature and the anonymity of bitcoin, however, have its limita-
tions. For example, buying and selling bitcoins, i.e., exchanging euros for bitcoins
and vice versa, takes places through a bitcoin exchange service. In the Netherlands,
cryptocurrency exchange services are not subjected to financial regulation. However,
larger exchange services have implemented a “know your customer policy” and
require identification when a customer turns to them for a transaction. In jurisdic-
tions such as the United States, these exchange services are in fact subjected to
supervision (Oerlemans et al. 2016, pp. 108–109). Furthermore, all bitcoin trans-
actions are logged in the blockchain. As a result, bitcoin transactions are transparent,
since they are publicly available via the blockchain. A bitcoin transaction consists of
the transfer of a certain number of bitcoins from one bitcoin address to another, and
that is exactly what is recorded in the blockchain. The blockchain, therefore, ensures
that a bitcoin can be traced back to its origin. However, the identity of those involved
in a bitcoin transaction, i.e., the people behind a sending or receiving bitcoin address,
is not revealed in the blockchain. On the other hand, separate transactions may be
linked to each other, which might leave, e.g., law enforcement agencies something to
work with. Furthermore, individual users of bitcoin technology do not always have
the required degree of vigilance and discipline to hide their identity. Meiklejohn et al.
(2013) showed that by using network analysis techniques and due to the “unsafe”
behavior of users, some bitcoin transactions can in fact be traced back to certain
individuals. Particularly where larger amounts of bitcoins are concerned, it could be
harder to maintain anonymity (Meiklejohn et al. 2013; Ron and Shamir 2013;
Oerlemans et al. 2016; Kruisbergen and Soudijn 2015). Clients may use several
services to obscure the traceability of bitcoin transactions (see below).
Besides the fact that anonymity of bitcoin users is not guaranteed, bitcoin also has
other drawbacks. Because of the lack of regulation, bitcoin users are not protected by
the safeguards applied to the formal financial sector. As a result, users are vulnerable
for losses caused by fraud, bankruptcy, and other misfortune. Customers of the once
very popular bitcoin exchange service Mt. Gox, for example, suffered when hun-
dreds of thousands of bitcoins “disappeared” in 2014. (Moore and Christin (2013)
discuss the risks involved in the use of bitcoin exchange services (their chapter was
published before the disappearance of bitcoins at Mt. Gox came to light).) Further-
more, hackers stole large amounts of the cryptocurrency Ethereum in 2017. (https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/07/17/coindash-website-hacked-7-million-stolen-in-ico.html.)
Another risk concerns the very volatile currency exchange rate. Finally, the accep-
tance of bitcoin as a payment method in the regular economy is still limited, although
the level of acceptance is increasing (Kruisbergen and Soudijn 2015; Oerlemans et
al. 2016).
The most striking continuity in money laundering methods as well as the most
striking similarity between cybercrime and traditional crime is the preference of
offenders for cash. “Traditional” organized crime offenders, i.e., offenders
Organized Financial Cybercrime: Criminal Cooperation, Logistic Bottlenecks. . . 13
participating in offline types of organized crime, as well as cybercrime offenders,
prefer cash (Kruisbergen et al. 2018; Soudijn 2017, 2018; Europol 2015). Cyber-
crime offenders often change their digital currencies for cash, at least in part. (This
process is probably also one of the most important bottlenecks in these types of
criminal operations, because changing digital currencies for cash in many cases
produces some sort of trace or paper trail.) In cases of phishing attacks, banking
malware, and ransomware, revenues, after using money mules or exchanging ser-
vices, often end up as “hard cash” in the hands of the main offenders. Likewise,
online drug traffickers seem to exchange the bitcoins they receive for cash (Leukfeldt
2014; Leukfeldt et al. 2017a, b, c; Odinot et al. 2017, p. 38; Oerlemans et al. 2016;
Kruisbergen et al. 2018). The use of new payment methods, such as cryptocurrencies
and prepaid cards, offers new possibilities for offenders, but in practice they are
predominantly used in combination with cash. Europol speaks of a symbiosis of
traditional methods and new technology (Europol 2015). The importance of cash for
the criminal economy might even have increased, due to the fact that digital payment
methods often produce traces and because of strict regulation of the legal financial
sector (Europol 2015; Soudijn 2017, 2018).
The moment a cybercrime offender holds his criminal earnings in cash, he may
use the same methods to conceal his money as offenders in other types of crime do.
The criminal money can be transferred (physically or by using money transfer
services or underground banking), cash might be used to buy valuable goods
(whether or not through using straw men or other schemes), and the money might
be laundered, for example, by faking legal economic activities (Kruisbergen et al.
2018; Europol 2015, pp. 370–378).
To conceal criminal earnings, offenders in cybercrime cases may use several
(new) types of service providers who, willingly or unwillingly, become involved in
criminal money flows. Some private bitcoin exchangers, for example, can be
considered as professional facilitators who willingly provide essential financial
services to offenders. For obvious reasons, cybercrime offenders do not want to
use a regular bitcoin exchange company to exchange their bitcoins (since regular
exchange services often require identification). Offenders instead rely on private
bitcoin exchangers who specialize in discrete financial service. These exchangers
receive a relatively high commission to exchange the illegally earned bitcoins for
cash euros (Kruisbergen et al. 2018).
So-called e-wallet services play a crucial role in the process of purchasing and
selling bitcoins. These services offer the possibility of obscuring the link between a
bitcoin address from which a bitcoin has been sent and a receiving address. Besides
specialized e-wallets, several services are available on the Internet to diminish the
traceability of bitcoins, so-called mixing or tumbler services, such as bitcoin fog and
helix. Other service providers that might be used concern, the earlier mentioned,
payment service providers and providers of prepaid cards. Furthermore, specific
types of straw men, money mules, are often used in cases of banking malware and
phishing. Analyses of Oerlemans and others show that these mules are predomi-
nantly recruited from young adults (18–22 years old) in disadvantaged areas in big
cities (Oerlemans et al. 2016; see also Maurtiz 2014). Finally, banks are crucial,
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since banks provide the infrastructure that banking malware offenders and bitcoin
exchangers, for example, take advantage of. Due to several measures taken by banks,
the financial damage as a result of banking malware has decreased enormously
recently (EMCDDA 2016; Odinot et al. 2017; Oerlemans et al. 2016; Soudijn
2017; Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB) 2017).
Conclusion
IT clearly has an impact on criminal collaborations: it offers offenders new possi-
bilities in the area of criminal cooperation, with regard to logistical aspects of the
criminal business process and with regard to criminal money flows. This way, IT
shifts the horizon for offenders looking for victims, co-offenders, tools, or cus-
tomers. Due to the Internet, offenders who wish to steal money from victims are
able to throw out a large dragnet. Offenders seeking specific knowledge or tools can
find these through criminal meeting places on the Internet. IT thus leads to new
forms of cooperation. Furthermore, both suppliers and consumers of drugs find
market places on the dark web that are, in essence, free of physical and social
limitations. Contacts in the offline world and close social relationships to this extent
seem less important because it is easier to find people, expertise, and tools. Trust, for
example, in the expertise of possible co-offenders or between buyers and sellers is,
however, still essential. Trust is now being established using the opportunities the
Internet offers to check the reputation of others (Holt et al. 2015; Décary-Hétu and
Dupont 2013; et al. 2016; Soudijn and Monsma 2012).
Offenders also make use of opportunities to communicate with each other in a
protected manner. Technological developments have made encrypted communica-
tion accessible to everyone. Hardware and software for shielded communication are
easily obtained and offer an important advantage to offenders wishing to coordinate
business without police interception. Furthermore, IT facilities, such as
cryptocurrencies, are also an important innovation. Cryptocurrencies have a certain
degree of anonymity and are the means of payment on dark net markets. Together
with TOR networks on which dark net markets operate, a currency such as bitcoin
makes it possible for buyers and sellers of illegal goods and services to enter into
more or less anonymous transactions.
These new possibilities offered by IT have implications for the ways offenders
operate. Looking at cybercrime cases, interesting parallels could be drawn with more
traditional organized crime. For example, it can be noticed that cybercrime cases are,
to a certain extent, locally embedded (see also Leukfeldt et al. 2017b, c, d, 2019;
Lusthaus and Varese 2017; Kruisbergen et al. 2018). Some of the main offenders in
cybercrime cases seem to share the same physical environment (because they know
each other, e.g., from the neighborhood or nightlife), and money mules are often
found in the immediate social vicinity. The sources of social capital that are used for
getting involved in organized forms of cybercrime, therefore, also consist largely of
offline and local interactions.
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Despite the fact that online marketplaces are theoretically not hindered by
borders, dark net markets also seem to have an important local (regional) physical
component. For example, important sellers on the online marketplace studied by
Kruisbergen et al. (2018) and Kruithof et al. (2016) handled their transactions,
particularly those of larger sizes, through physical meetings. Furthermore, in a
large part of the transactions done on the marketplace, buyer and seller appeared
to live in nearby countries. It is possible that the offenders think that, currently,
sending postal items is too risky.
Finally, some offenders still depend on local facilities, such as postal companies
for online drug vendors and public places with Wi-Fi access (such as fast-food
restaurants) for bitcoin exchangers. Another important finding is that cybercriminals
still seem to prefer cash. For traditional forms of organized crime, the dominance of
cash is a known fact, but also offenders operating online seem to have a preference to
exchange at least part of their digital revenue for cash.
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